Populism and political corruption

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between populism and political corruption. Using discourse analysis, it shows that the two phenomena are inextricably linked, as political corruption, along with a lack of good governance, ultimately fosters resentment and distrust in public institutions—attitudes that present an opportunity for populists to employ populist rhetoric in their electoral campaigns. The paper argues that the anger generated by corruption among citizens plays a vital role in bringing populists to power, as they often succeed precisely by promising to eradicate corruption. Drawing on existing literature, the paper finds that populists are more likely to make promises but less likely to keep them—often encouraging new forms of corruption and proving ineffective in addressing existing ones. Populist rule is characterized by three distinct practices: the attempted capture of the state apparatus; corruption and mass clientelism; and the systematic suppression of civil society, which, under the populist principle of ruling “in the name of the people,” becomes delegitimized and increasingly constrained. The paper proposes that the transition from populism to political corruption operates not only at the national level but also at the local level, where politicians are similarly more likely to act populistically when high levels of corruption are already present in the political landscape. Finally, the paper considers a scenario in which populism, combined with political corruption, enables the capture of the state as the highest possible form of corruption.